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Abstract
This paper uses household panel data to provide robust evidence on the eﬀects of
BRAC’s Targeting the Ultra-poor Program in Bangladesh. Our identiﬁcation strategy
exploits type-1 errors in assignment, comparing households correctly included with those
incorrectly excluded, according to program criteria. Evidence from diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
matching and sensitivity analysis shows that participation had signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on
income, food consumption and security, household durables, and livestock, but no robust
impact on health, ownership of homestead land, housing quality and other productive
assets. Using quantile diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence, we ﬁnd that the income gains from program
participation is smaller for the lowest two deciles.
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It is increasingly appreciated, both by practitioners and academics alike, that extreme
poverty (or ultra-poverty) is qualitatively di®erent from other forms of poverty and depriva-
tion (see, for example, IFPRI (2007), Matin et. al. (2008), WDR (2006), Lipton (1983)).1
Ultra-poverty di®ers from conventional poverty in terms of depth (degree of deprivation),
length (duration of time) and breadth (the number of dimensions such as illiteracy, malnu-
trition etc.).2 The possible complementarity among the di®erent dimensions is argued to
potentially result in multiple mutually reinforcing poverty traps. This makes ultra-poverty
a qualitatively di®erent problem to address than conventional poverty.
The experience of last few decades suggests that while the poverty programs of NGOs
including microcredit programs have, in general, been successful in reaching the moderate
poor (i.e., households below poverty line, but relatively close to it), the poorest of the poor
are more often inadequately served or completely bypassed by such programs.3 This ap-
preciation led to the development and implementation of innovative anti-poverty programs
that are designed especially for the ultra-poor. These programs address the multitude
of interrelated factors that create the conditions of extreme poverty and make it a trap
1Although there is a growing consensus that extreme or ultra-poverty is an important and di±cult
problem requiring novel intervention strategies, the concept of \ultra-poverty" remains unsettled. There
are di®erent de¯nitions in the literature: Lipton (1983) de¯nes ultra-poverty in terms of a calorie intake
threshold (a person is ultra-poor if he/she gets 80 percent or less calorie of an appropriate poverty line
calorie benchmark); a recent IFPRI report (2007) identi¯es an individual as ultra-poor if he/she lives on
less than 54 cents per day. Emran, Shilpi, and Stiglitz (2008) de¯ne ultra-poverty in terms of endowments
and access to markets; physical and human capital endowments of the ultra-poor are so low that it results
in exclusion from both labor and formal credit markets. In this paper, we do not focus on how to de¯ne
or identify the ultra-poor, taking the BRAC identi¯cation scheme as given for the empirical analysis. The
BRAC de¯nition refers to \not being able to meet even the barest of the basic needs". For recent analysis
of issues related to identi¯cation and proper targeting of the ultra-poor, see Banrejee et. al. (2008) and
Sulaiman and Matin (2006).
2For discussions, see World Bank (2000), Smith (2005), and Chronic Poverty Research center (2008).
3BRAC founder Fazle Hasan Abed lamented that, \despite our e®orts, we have not succeeded in reaching
the ultra poor" (Smith 2005 p. 90).
1di±cult to escape from.
BRAC, formerly known as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, had been at
the forefront of such innovative programs for addressing extreme poverty. In 2002, BRAC
developed and implemented an innovative anti-poverty program called \Challenging the
Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Targeting the Ultra-poor, Targeting Social Constraints"
(henceforth TUP). The ¯rst phase of the TUP program was implemented over 2002-2006.
It covered 100,000 ultra-poor households from 15 of the poorest districts of Bangladesh
over a period of ¯ve years.4 TUP is a multidimensional program that incorporates both
livelihood protection and promotion components. It features signi¯cant innovations in tar-
geting (through participatory wealth ranking by the villagers) and harnessing social capital
(through village support networks and sponsorship of community leaders). It focuses on de-
veloping human capital (health, education, and training) and physical capital (asset trans-
fers) for poor women with the goal of helping them graduate to the standard micro-credit
program of BRAC. The program provides ongoing training in enterprise activities using
the transferred asset, and also provides health services. A more complete discussion of the
program is provided in Section 2. TUP as a strategy to tackle ultra-poverty has attracted
much attention over last few years among NGO communities and academic researchers.
Similar programs are already being replicated in several other countries including Uganda
and Tanzania.5
This paper uses a two period panel data set (2002, 2005) to analyze the e®ects of the
4A second phase of the TUP program covering 40 districts was initiated in 2007. 863,000 households
are expected to participate in the second phase over ¯ve years (2007-2011). This paper provides evidence
of the e®ects of the ¯rst phase of the TUP program. For more details on the second phase of the TUP
program, see BRAC Annual Report 2007.
5Other examples of programs for ultra poverty include the Grameen beggars program and the Bandhan
\Chartering into Unventured Frontiers- Targeting the Hardcore Poor (CUF-THP) program.
2¯rst phase of the TUP program on a set of household outcomes including income, food
security, health, productive assets, household durable goods, and women empowerment.6
The assignment errors in the selection of participants in the TUP program (according to
the inclusion and exclusion criteria set out by BRAC) are used to partition the sample to
generate appropriate treatment and comparison groups.7 Our preferred treatment (called
SB1; or `should be, one') and comparison (called SB0; or `should be, zero') groups are
identi¯ed on the basis of type 1 error. The treatment group thus consists of the households
who satisfy the BRAC inclusion and exclusion criteria and thus are correctly selected into
the program, while the comparison group consists of the households who are incorrectly
excluded from the program according to the stated criteria.8 The di®erences in the initial
economic characteristics between the treatment-comparison pair SB1and SB0 are much
smaller compared to the BRAC's own classi¯cation called SUP (selected ultra-poor, i.e.,
the treatment group) and NSUP (not selected ultra-poor). The treatment group SB1
also consists of the poorest of the households in our sample (i.e., the ultra-poor) and thus
represents the appropriate treatment group given that the focus of the TUP program and
our evaluation is on this speci¯c disadvantaged group.
To provide robust evidence on the treatment e®ect of participation in the TUP program,
we use a rich set of econometric techniques. Starting from a simple di®erence-in-di®erence
6An earlier version of the paper did not include the results on productive assets and household durable
goods such as tubewells and blankets.
7A descriptive analysis of the TUP program was done by BRAC's in-house research and evaluation
division (RED) using the same panel data set (see Rabbani et. al. 2006). They use the selected ultra
poor (SUP) as the treatment group and the not selected ultra-poor (NSUP) as the comparison group.
8It is possible that at least some of the eligible households are excluded from the program to create
an appropriate comparison group, or for some other reasons. We do not have any systematic information
about the nature of these exclusions. Whether an outcome of accident or designed to create a comparison
group, the eligible but excluded households are natural comparison group for our treatment group. For an
in-depth examination of other potential selection issues, please see section 4 on empirical strategy below.
3approach (DID), we allow for di®erent time trends in di®erent districts and control for se-
lection on observables. In particular, we use the di®erence-in-di®erence matching estimator
(Heckman et. al., 1998, Todd, 2007) that combines a di®erence-in-di®erence approach with
the matching technique to eliminate the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity (hence-
forth called DIDM approach). The evidence from the DID and DIDM approaches shows
that there is signi¯cant positive e®ect of participation in the TUP program on net income,
food security, quality of housing, household durables including tubewells and blankets, and
livestock of the ultra-poor.9 There is very weak or no evidence of any signi¯cant e®ect of
the TUP program on subjective health outcomes, women's empowerment,10 ownership of
homestead land and stocks of other productive assets (such as a ¯shing net or rickshaw
van). Although the estimates from the DID and DIDM approaches show a statistically
signi¯cant and numerically important e®ect for the ultra-poor group SB1 for a number of
important outcome variables, it is not always robust to allowing for even a small amount of
selection on unobservables. For example, the program impact on housing quality and some
of the household durable goods noted above is not robust to allowing for low to moderate
levels of selection on unobservables.
Although the estimates of the average treatment e®ect on treated (ATT) from the DIDM
approach are useful as summary measures of the e®ects of the TUP program participation,
they are unable to shed much light on the possible heterogeneity in the treatment e®ects.
9The DIDM approach takes care of time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, but still relies on selec-
tion on observables to defend the common time trend assumption. However, there can be time variant
unobserved heterogeneity that gives rise to di®erential time trends across the treatment and compari-
son groups. We thus use the recently proposed sensitivity analysis of matching estimators to see if the
estimated treatment e®ects can be swamped by low to moderate selection on unobservables.
10The indicator for women's empowerment used is the ratio of number of sari (women's clothing) to lungi
(men's clothing)).
4We provide some evidence of heterogeneous treatment e®ect of the TUP program focusing
on the net income gains of the households. We analyze the TUP program impact on
household's net income using the Quantile Di®erence-in-Di®erence estimator (henceforth
QDID) that allows for di®erential treatment e®ects across the distribution. The results
show that although, in general, strict monotonicity in the treatment e®ect does not hold, the
income gains from program participation for the lowest two deciles is much less compared
to the top two deciles of ultra-poor households.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of
the BRAC TUP program. The following section discusses the data and variables. Section
4 is devoted to a discussion of the empirical strategy for identi¯cation and estimation of the
treatment e®ects in greater detail. The next section reports the estimated treatment e®ects
of program participation on a set of household outcomes in a sequential manner starting
from a simple di®erence-in-di®erence approach. The paper concludes with a summary of
the ¯ndings.
2. The BRAC Ultra-poverty Program
One of the most comprehensive and innovative approaches to redressing ultra-poverty
has been developed and implemented by BRAC. BRAC is the world's largest NGO by some
measures (membership, scope, and budget). Founded 1972, it started micro¯nance in 1974,
which now includes approximately seven million women members. The BRAC Education
Program (BEP) serves over 1 million (10%) Bangladeshi primary students in some 35,000
informal schools. Over 110 million receive BRAC health and other services in Bangladesh.
BRAC features such diverse activities as development-oriented enterprises, legal education
5for the poor, a bank, a university, and an internet service provider, among others. BRAC
is now expanding abroad including activities in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Tanzania,
and South Sudan.
TUP (phase I) was launched in three relatively poor districts in Northwest Bangladesh
(Rangpur, Kurigram, and Nilphamari, identi¯ed on the basis of poverty mapping), with
more than 5000 women selected from a larger group of potential participants, who together
form the basis for our panel data set.11 All members of participant and comparison groups
were selected by villagers as among the poorest local families. A subset was selected by
BRAC according to exclusion and inclusion criteria. The exclusion criteria required that
participating women must be capable of doing work outside the home, must not belong to
another NGO program and must not receive a food bene¯ts card. In the inclusion criteria,
participating women have to meet three of the following: child labor is present; ownership
of less than 10 decimals of land (a tenth of an acre), lack of a male earner at home, adult
women selling labor outside of the household, and lack of any productive assets (Noor et
al 2004, p. ix, BRAC Annual Report 2007, P. 24).
To identify the ultra-poor women, several strategies were used. One is \Participa-
tory Wealth Ranking" that utilizes local information available to the villagers. A meeting
is held in which a village map is drawn on the ground with each household labeled. The
villagers agree on a wealth ranking among the households, to identify those who are the
poorest of the poor. Those who can a®ord tin plate walls or roofs are less poor than those
with straw walls or thatched roofs. Those who are known to have a steady, formal job
are categorized as among the well o®. To keep the process manageable, only about 150
11As mentioned before, starting from the three poor districts, the ¯rst phase of the TUP program was
scaled up to cover 15 districts and 100,000 households over a period of ¯ve years.
6households were included in each wealth ranking exercise.
There are incentives for people to rank themselves as poor enough to receive assistance;
but the multiple checks done on family status means their ability to get away with this
is sharply limited. The mechanism is not perfect; better o® people may ¯nd ways to
convince BRAC sta® that they should be counted among the poor, and conversely, those
in the most extreme poverty may not come forward at all; and people may forget their
small huts when drawing village maps. Or, the poorest may not be identi¯ed because they
are viewed as a part of the household of distant relatives who function in a clientelistic
relationship with the poor (Matin et al 2008). Indeed, the more socially excluded among
the poor may be less likely to be picked{yet their social exclusion is a fundamental cause
of their poverty. To supplement community meetings, BRAC sta® members walk through
the village, looking for any hut that gives the appearance of extreme poverty. They then
try to bring potentially overlooked ultra-poor people to the attention of the community
meetings. Village leaders, generally people who are relatively well educated such as the
schoolteachers, had been actively involved in all stages of the process.
The TUP program works to improve the physical, human, and social capital of the poor-
est 20% of the population. A core activity of the program is to provide participants with
a grant of speci¯c physical assets. The TUP program then provides assistance for using
the transferred assets e®ectively as a microenterprise. In particular, BRAC sta® members
o®er ongoing training in speci¯c enterprise activities notably livestock and poultry rearing,
fruit, vegetable and herb cultivation, operation of tree nurseries, and village vending such
as circulating around the village with a pushcart. Each training program is targeted to
the speci¯c asset transferred; periodic refresher training is o®ered. After enterprises are
7established, micro¯nance and related services are eventually provided through the equiva-
lent of BRAC's primary Village Organizations. A goal of mainstreaming these clients into
micro¯nance is to enable them to maintain and expand their businesses over time.
The TUP program works to develop human capital through the microenterprise train-
ing, as well as general education including functional literacy, and improved health. BRAC
provides the program participants (SUPs) with health services. BRAC sta® including
BRAC's village health volunteers known as Shastho Shebikas provide training, basic care,
and referrals. BRAC sta® educate the SUPs concerning health matters during special
sessions, and provide point of ¯rst contact health services, referring SUPs to doctors and
other health professionals when possibly signi¯cant health problems are indicated. Finan-
cial assistance for illness is provided. Direct services include child health, immunization,
diarrheal disease control, vitamin A supplements for children under 5, TB control, and
family planning services and pregnancy care. Yet another activity is to install sanitary
latrines.
The program also seeks to build social capital through village support networks and
sponsorship of community leaders for extremely poor women. The village support com-
mittees engage elites, often individuals who are known for public-spirited or religiously
motivated charitable works. The committees assist the TUP participants when they are
subjected to various types of shocks, such as by helping them to recover lost assets.
3. The Data and Variables Description
For the empirical analysis, we use the BRAC TUP panel data set. This is a two-year
panel of about 5000 households. The baseline survey of 5626 households was done in
82002. In 2005, 5288 households were resurveyed, along with 278 newly formed households
that had split from the initial set of households. Attrition was moderate and was due to
migration, death, and marriage. The ¯nal matched panel contained 5067 households.
The BRAC TUP panel data set provides information on a wide range of household
characteristics and outcomes. The survey contains a rich body of information regarding
the asset base of the household that includes natural (land), physical, human, ¯nancial
and social capital. We estimate the causal e®ects of program participation on income
and physical assets, food security, health, and women's empowerment. Food security is
measured by three indicators: food availability, grain stock, and the ability of a household
to manage two meals a day. The physical assets include livestock (cow/bull, duck, hen
etc.), other productive assets (such as a ¯shing net, rickshaw van, and \big trees" producing
sticks, small lumber, fuelwood, or fruit) and household durable goods such as tubewells,
blankets, beds, chairs and tables. The assets measures used as the outcomes do not include
any assets transferred from the TUP program. The health indicators are subjective health
status reported by the respondents. As a measure of women's empowerment we use the
ratio of sari (female clothing) to lungi (male clothing). For poor households in Bangladesh
this is a reasonable indicator of relative expenditure on feminine goods in the household.
There is a large literature that uses relative expenditure on feminine goods as an indicator
of female empowerment (see for example, Deaton (1989), and Strauss and Thomas (1995)).
Although our analysis covers both the °ow and stock variables, one might argue that
three years may not be enough to capture long term e®ects of the program, and thus
the evidence on the stock variables should be interpreted with appropriate caveats. It is
possible that our analysis underestimates of the long-run e®ects of program participation
9on the stock variables.
The variables used for matching estimator are (at 2002 levels): gender of household
head, body mass index, age of the household head, each of the inclusion criteria, a dummy
for whether the main source of income was from day-labor activities, and a variable that
measures the amount of land that the individual owned.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the relevant variables used in this paper.
One can see some interesting changes from 2002 to 2005 for the sample of households
in the panel. There are signi¯cant improvements for an average household from 2002 to
2005 in terms of most of the indicators including large gains in net income, food availability,
housing (tin roof), livestock, and most of the assets.12. Somewhat surprisingly, even though
food availability has increased on an average, the percentage of households that can have
two meals a day declined. There is also some evidence that the ownership of homestead
land has worsened on average from 2002 to 2005.
4. Empirical Strategy
For a proper analysis of the treatment e®ect of the TUP program, we need to construct
the treatment and comparison groups carefully so that any potential selection bias can be
minimized. BRAC's own treatment and comparison groups are called \selected ultra-poor"
(SUP) and \nonselected ultra-poor" (NSUP). Although both the treatment group (SUP)
and the comparison group (NSUP) in the BRAC panel data set are drawn from among
extremely poor households identi¯ed by villagers (thus re°ecting local knowledge), they
are di®erentiated by BRAC's systematic inclusion and exclusion criteria, and may su®er
12This is consistent with the recent evidence that Bangladesh has achieved signi¯cant reduction in rural
poverty over last two decades (see, for example, Sen and Hulme, 2006)
10from other selection biases for a variety of reasons (see below). So the SUP-NSUP subsets
may not be the best possible treatment and comparison groups for estimating the treatment
e®ects, especially when the interest lies in understanding the e®ects of the program on the
ultra-poor. We utilize errors in assignment in BRAC's selection to construct alternative
treatment and comparison groups based on type 1 and type 2 errors. Based on the formal
selection criteria of BRAC, we partition the sample of households in the panel data set into
four subsets. They are: (i) households that are eligible according to the stated criteria and
are included in the program (subset called the \should be, one" (SB1) group henceforth),
(ii) the eligible households not selected (called the \should be, zero" group (SB0)), (iii)
households ineligible according to formal criteria but selected in the program (called the
\should not be, one" group (SNB1)), and (iv) households ineligible and not selected (called
the \should not be, zero" group (SNB0)). For details on the construction of these four
subsets, please see Appendix 1.
There are two levels of selection problems that we have to consider: (i) BRAC's se-
lection process, and (ii) the participation decision by households. As discussed earlier,
BRAC's selection process was based on a set of explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria.
To understand the nature of potential selection bias arising from BRAC's selection process
we need to have an implicit model of the actual decision making by BRAC employees. The
simplest model is to assume that BRAC employees were following the set of inclusion and
exclusion criteria strictly, and thus the assignment errors discovered in the data are either
completely random or due to the fact that some eligible households declined to participate
in the program. If self-selection out of the program by eligible households is important
then households in group SB0 are likely to di®er systematically from eligible households
11that participate in the program, i.e., SB1. The alternative model is to assume that BRAC
employees were using both the formal criteria and private signals available to them. In
this case, the objective function of the BRAC employees becomes critical. If the objective
was to identify the true ultra-poor, then the group of households who should have been in
the program according to the set of formal criteria but were not selected (i.e., SB0) must
be relatively well o® (more advantaged) in terms of initial economic conditions and charac-
teristics in 2002. Under the alternative assumption that the objective was to identify and
exclude potentially high risk households so as to help ensure the \success" of the program,
then the SB0 group is likely to be systematically more disadvantaged in 2002. The most
plausible scenario, however, is that there is heterogeneity among the BRAC employees, and
thus both positive and negative selections may characterize our data set. Interestingly,
the evidence presented below shows that the SB1 and SB0 groups are, on an average, very
similar in terms of initial economic characteristics in 2002. This evidence is consistent
with two alternative hypotheses: (i) the positive and negative selections largely o®set each
other, or (ii) the private signals of BRAC employees were not important for the screening
process, at least with regards to the sub-samples we are focusing on.13
Table 2a reports the di®erence in means and the associated standard errors for a set
of observable characteristics in 2002 across di®erent pairs of treatment-comparison groups.
The ¯rst column gives the initial di®erence in means for the SUP ¡ NSUP, the second
for SB1 ¡SB0 , the third for SNB1 ¡SNB0; and the last for SB1 ¡SNB0: The evidence
in Table 2a clearly shows that the initial di®erence in the means is, in general, much lower
for the treatment-comparison pair SB1 ¡ SB0: In contrast, there are some signi¯cant and
13In addition, some of the eligible households might have been excluded to create a proper comparison
group, a possibility mentioned before.
12relatively large di®erences in the initial conditions in 2002 between the treatment and
comparison groups as de¯ned by BRAC (i.e., the subsets SUP and NSUP) and used
by BRAC's Research and Evaluation Division (RED) in its \descriptive analysis" of the
TUP program (Rabbani, Prakash, and Sulaiman, 2006). This con¯rms the possibility that
the NSUP may not be an appropriate comparison group for the treatment group SUP.
Consider for example, the variable \change in net income over the last year" in the ¯rst
row. The di®erences in means are: Tk:162 (SB1¡SB0); Tk:1924 (SUP¡NSUP); Tk:1362
(SNB1¡SNB0), and Tk:5289 (SB1¡SNB0): It is interesting that the subsamples SB1and
SB0 look much more similar according to the observable characteristics reported in Table
2a. Since selection on observables and selection on unobservables are likely to be related
(a point emphasized recently by Altonji et. al. (2005)), SB0 constitutes an appropriate
comparison group to estimate the treatment e®ect when the treatment group is SB1. The
fact that the groups SB1 and SB0 look similar to each other is, however, not consistent
with the hypothesis that BRAC employees were systematically excluding speci¯c types of
households from the set of eligible households.14 This evidence also does not lend support
to the hypothesis that the SB0 households self-selected out of the program because they
are very di®erent types of households compared with the eligible participants (i.e., SB1
households).15 Note that the treatment group SB1 and the comparison group SNB0
satisfy the BRAC inclusion and exclusion criteria perfectly. The di®erence in means in
2002 between these two groups is much more pronounced than the di®erences across SUP
14Note that although BRAC employees may have more information, some of the most important indi-
vidual characteristics like ability are unobservable to both BRAC employees and the econometrician.
15It is possible, at least in theory, that the selection is dominated by unobservable characteristics. We
implement sensitivity tests for the DIDM results to see if the estimated treatment e®ects can be driven by
selection on unobservables (see Table 5 below).
13and NSUP (see Table 2a).
The evidence also indicates that there are important di®erences in the initial conditions
across the three di®erent treatment groups. Table 2b reports the group averages of a set of
variables in 2002 across the groups. Although the groups are similarly situated according to
some observables like food availability, and quality of houses as indicated by the roof made of
tin, the SB1 group is clearly the poorest among them. While the percentage of households
who own their homestead land is 39 percent for the SB1 group, the corresponding numbers
for SUP and SNB1 are 47 percent and 53 percent respectively. The increase in net income
from 2001-2002 was Tk:5860 for an average SB1 household, Tk:8150 for SUP; and Tk:9787
for SNB1: This implies that if one is interested in understanding the treatment e®ect of
the TUP program on the poorest of the poor, SB1 is the most appropriate treatment
group to focus on with the appropriate comparison group SB0. Given the above analysis,
our focus is on the estimates of treatment e®ects (ATT) from the combination of SB1
(treatment) and SB0 (comparison). As a benchmark, we also report the estimates from
BRAC's own classi¯cation (i.e., SUP (treatment) and NSUP (comparison)). However,
one should interpret the estimated treatment e®ects on SUP with appropriate caution, as
selection bias can be important in this case given the di®erence in initial characteristics
between the SUP and NSUP in 2002. We do not report or discuss the treatment e®ect
estimates for the treatment group SNB1 as it is composed of relatively richer households,
and thus clearly not the target group of the TUP program. The results are, however,
available from the authors.16
To estimate the treatment e®ect using the alternative treatment-comparison groups as
16The caveat about selection bias discussed for the SUP group applies equally for this group.
14discussed above, we use di®erence in di®erence (DID) with and without di®erential time
trends in di®erent districts (i.e., Rangpur, Kurigram, and Nilphamari). Moreover, addi-
tional controls are included in the DID regressions which might a®ect both the treatment
decision and the outcome variables to account for possible selection on observables. We
also combine the di®erence-in-di®erence approach with matching (the DIDM estimator).
As mentioned earlier, the DIDM approach purges any time invariant heterogeneity at the
individual level by time di®erencing; and then matching takes care of selection on observ-
ables in a °exible way without imposing any particular functional form. This, however,
does not address the possibility that the estimated treatment e®ect may be contaminated
by selection on unobservables that vary over time and thus may result in di®erential time
trends across treatment and comparison groups. We implement sensitivity analysis for
the DIDM results to see if the estimated treatment e®ects can be driven by reasonable
magnitudes of selection on time varying unobservable factors.
There has been a growing appreciation in the recent literature that treatment e®ects
are, in general, heterogeneous in a non-trivial way (Ravallion, 2007, Heckman, et. al. 1998).
We implement a quantile di®erence in di®erence approach (QDID) to provide some evidence
on heterogeneity in the treatment e®ects focusing on income as the outcome. We report
results from the alternative speci¯cations of the QDID: common time trends, di®erential
time trends in di®erent districts, and also with and without additional controls to take into
account selection on observables.
5.Treatment E®ects (ATT) of the TUP Program
(5.1) Results from the Di®erence-in-Di®erence Approach
15In this section, we report the estimated treatment e®ects on a set of household outcomes
including income, assets, and health related indicators using alternative speci¯cations of
the di®erence-in-di®erence approach. The standard di®erence-in-di®erence speci¯cation is
based on the following model of the treatment e®ect:
Yit = ®0 + ®1d05 + ®2dT + ¯ (dT ¤ d05) + ²it (1)
where Yit is the outcome variable of interest for household i in year t, d05 is a dummy that
equals 1 for the year 2005, and dT is a dummy that equals 1 when household i belongs
to an appropriately de¯ned treatment group (i.e., SB1;SUP;SNB1) and equals zero when
a household belongs to the corresponding comparison group (i.e., SB0;NSUP;SNB0).
The parameter of interest is ¯, which isolates the treatment e®ect on outcome Y under
certain assumptions. The crucial di®erence-in-di®erence estimation assumption is that
the treatment and comparison groups would follow the same trend in the absence of the
program. If this assumption is not satis¯ed, the estimate of the treatment e®ect ^ ¯ will be
biased when we use OLS to estimate equation (1). We augment the basic DID speci¯cation
in two ways to make it more plausible that the counterfactual trend for the treatment
group is well represented by the actual trend in the comparison group. First, we allow for
di®erential time trends in the di®erent districts in our data set. This leads to the following
speci¯cation:
Yit = ®0 + ®1d05 + ®1R (d05 ¤ dR) + ®1K (d05 ¤ dK) + ®2dT + ¯ (dT ¤ d05) + ²it (2)
16where dR and dK are dummies for Rangpur and Kurigram districts respectively.17 This
is relevant because evidence reported in Sen and Hulme (2005) indicates that a measure
of human poverty fell in the 1995-2000 period by 3.57% in Nilphamari, but only 1.73%
in Kurigram and 1.65% in Rangpur. In addition, we allow for the possibility that the
trends might di®er across households with di®erent observable characteristics. Thus, we
also control for a set of observables that are likely to be important for selection into the
treatment (either because of BRAC's criteria, or the household's own outside option).
Controlling for selection on observables results in the following speci¯cation of the DID
regression:
Yit = ®0 + ®1d05 + ®1R (d05 ¤ dR) + ®1K (d05 ¤ dK) + ®2dT + X
0
02¦ + ¯ (dT ¤ d05) + ²it (3)
where X02 is the set of controls in 2002 added to equation (2) above.18
Table 3a presents the estimated treatment e®ect from speci¯cations (1)-(3) for both our
and BRAC's treatment-comparison pairs, (SB1 and SB0) and (SUP and NSUP) respec-
tively. For binary outcome variables such as food availability or homestead ownership, we
report the estimates from probit regressions, although the estimates from linear probability
models are, in general, very similar.19 A few general patterns emerge from the estimates
reported in Table 3a. Although the magnitudes of the estimated treatment e®ects vary
across di®erent speci¯cations of the di®erence-in-di®erence regression, in general they fall
17The omitted district is thus Nilphamari.
18The set of variables used to control for selection on observables is discussed in detail in the following
section where the results from the DIDM approach are presented.
19The estimates for \food availability" are somewhat di®erent in terms of their numerical magnitude when
we use a linear probability model. However, the main conclusions of the paper remain intact irrespective
of the estimation method. The linear probability estimates are available from the authors.
17within tight bounds (an exception is the `change in net income'). The estimates of the
treatment e®ect vary a little more across the treatment-comparison pairs. Although the
di®erence in the magnitude is in general small, the estimates from the BRAC classi¯cation
(SUP ¡NSUP) and our preferred classi¯cation (SB1¡SB0) di®er signi¯cantly for some of
the of the most important outcomes (for example, change in net income and grain stock).
It is important to appreciate that the broad similarity in terms of absolute magnitudes of
the treatment e®ect across the treatment groups can be misleading as the households in
the SB1 group may start from a much lower initial condition in 2002 in terms of a given
indicator like `change in net income' and assets.20 The treatment e®ect is substantially
higher for the SB1 group relative to SUP when we normalize by the mean in 2002 for
di®erent groups for such outcomes (reported in Table 3b). The results in Tables 3a-3b
indicate that TUP program participation has had signi¯cant positive e®ects on a number of
important household outcomes including net income, food security, livestock, and durable
goods such as blankets and tubewells, especially for the target group, i.e., the participating
households that satisfy the BRAC selection criteria (SB1). In contrast, there is no signi¯-
cant e®ect on any of the health related indicators, other productive assets (such as ¯shing
nets, rickshaw/van), or on ownership of homestead land.
We now turn to the details of the results. Considering ¯rst the impact on `change in
reported income over the last year', income gains are consistently higher for the participants
in the TUP program across all three di®erent speci¯cations of DID for both SB1 and SUP:
The estimates for our preferred treatment group SB1 show that controlling for observable
20We emphasize again that this comparison between SB1 and SUP may not be appropriate as the
treatment e®ect estimates for SUP may su®er signi¯cantly from selection bias given that the comparison
group NSUP di®ers substantially in terms of 2002 characteristics. But we use the SUP results as the
relevant benchmark as this is the treatment group used by BRAC.
18characteristics substantially reduces the estimate of the treatment e®ect while allowing for
a di®erential time trend does not have any appreciable e®ect. The estimate from the
most general speci¯cation of DID shows a higher impact of the program on the SB1 group
(Tk:3131) compared to the BRAC treatment group SUP (Tk:2941): When expressed as
percentage of the group mean in 2002, the treatment e®ect for SB1 (53 percent) is much
higher than that for SUP (36 percent) (see Table 3b).
Failing to own the land on which ones house is located is a basic determinant (and
indicator) of lacking even the most minimal wealth and security. The houses of participants
are generally little more than one room shacks, so lack of ownership of these tiny plots is a
signal of extreme poverty, insecurity, and general vulnerability. The estimates show a weak
program impact on this outcome variable. There is a small but statistically signi¯cant e®ect
according to the simple DID and DID with di®erential time trend estimates. However,
once we control for observable characteristics, the impact is reduced more and becomes
statistically insigni¯cant at the 10 percent level for the SB1, although the e®ect remains
signi¯cant for the BRAC treatment group SUP. An interpretation is that conclusions
based on the SUP group would have been misleading in this case if one is interested in
understanding the program impact on the ultra-poor. A related outcome variable is tin
material for roofs, a positive indicator of the overall housing quality in rural Bangladesh.
Interestingly, there is a signi¯cant program impact irrespective of DID speci¯cations for
both SB1 and SUP groups. Also, the magnitude of the program e®ect does not vary
signi¯cantly between the SB1 and SUP groups (see Tables 3a and 3b).
We now turn our attention to a set of asset variables, broadly classi¯ed as livestock
(number of cow/bulls, goat/sheep, duck/hens), productive assets (number of ¯shing nets,
19big trees, kg of grain, number of rickshaws/vans and bicycles), and household durable goods
(number of chair/tables, beds, radio/TVs, quilt/blankets, and tubewells).21 With respect
to livestock 22, tubewells and quilts/blankets, there is a strong positive impact on the
ultra-poor group SB1: Similar e®ects are also found for the BRAC treatment group. The
di®erences in the magnitudes of the treatment e®ects are, in general, not large between
SUP and SB1; and they do not reveal any clear pattern. However, when we consider
the normalized treatment e®ects, the SB1 group is the one with the higher impact for all
livestock assets (see Table 3b).
The evidence on the stock of other productive assets for SB1 shows that there is, in
general, no signi¯cant program impact once we control for the observables (see column
(3)). If we focus on the most general speci¯cation of the DID, for `big tree' there is strong
positive impact of the program on the BRAC treatment group SUP, but no impact on
SB1: One would thus arrive at a wrong conclusion regarding the program e®ect on the
ultra-poor if SUP is used as the treatment group instead of SB1: Curiously, there is a
statistically signi¯cant negative e®ect of the TUP program on the number of bicycles in a
household for the SB1 group, although the e®ect is numerically small.
For household durable goods, except for radio/TV, the impact of TUP program par-
ticipation is statistically signi¯cant and similar across di®erent treatment groups and DID
speci¯cations. The magnitudes of the the treatment e®ects from the most general speci¯-
cation of DID are slightly higher for SB1 except for the case of number of beds a household
21The DID equations for the asset variables reported in Table 3.a are estimated by OLS. The pattern
of the treatment e®ect does not change if we instead look at the net change in the stock of a given asset
from 2002 to 2005 and estimate a binary model (probit) distinguishing between positive and non-positive
changes.
22These are considered as savings by the TUP, and the program did not provide them.
20owns. The normalized program e®ects preserve this pattern of relative magnitudes (see
Table 3b).
Perhaps the most important impacts in terms of human welfare were found in alleviating
the problem of food insecurity. We use three indicators of food security: `food availability',
grain stock, and `ability to obtain two meals a day', as reported in Tables 3a-3b. The
estimates show strong evidence of a signi¯cant positive impact of TUP participation on food
security across both the treatment groups. If we focus on the most general speci¯cation of
the DID, the treatment e®ects are similar for SUP and SB1 for two of the food security
indicators (food availability and two meals a day), while the impact on grain stock is much
higher for the treatment group SB1. It is interesting that the estimates for food availability
and grain stock in the case of the BRAC treatment group SUP are a®ected in a signi¯cant
way when we control for observable characteristics. This can be interpreted as evidence
that selection on observables is especially important for the SUP group with regards to
these particular food security outcomes.
Next, consider the survey questions on self-reported subjective health status and health
improvement over last year. The estimated treatment e®ects are numerically small across
the board and not signi¯cant at 5 percent level. We thus do not ¯nd any evidence of any
signi¯cant e®ect of TUP program participation on the subjective health outcomes. Al-
though this might re°ect the fact that health improvements take time and may be subject
to threshold e®ects, the evidence should be interpreted with additional caveats. The re-
ported health indicators may have signi¯cant measurement error or reporting bias, in part
due to its subjective nature, and in part because better health training, as provided in the
program, can lead to increased awareness of participants' conditions as health problems.
21This e®ect would bias downward responses from actual improvements.
An indicator of basic wellbeing for women in Bangladesh is the number of saris (dresses)
a woman owns. Following the literature, this can also be viewed as an indicator of a woman's
bargaining power in the household.23 It is interesting that the treatment e®ect is signi¯cant
both numerically and statistically across treatment groups and DID speci¯cations. The
normalized treatment e®ects are also similar (see Table 3b).
The evidence on number of saris discussed above is, however, a noisy indicator of a
woman's bargaining power at best. Even if there is no change in the bargaining power of
women due to participation in the TUP program, the number of saris a woman owns may
be higher because of an income e®ect re°ecting higher income gains discussed earlier. A
better indicator of women's household bargaining power is the ratio of saris (dresses) to
lungis (male clothing). The estimates in Table 3a show that there is a signi¯cant e®ect of
TUP program participation on the ratio of saris to lungis for the BRAC treatment group
SUP, but no statistically signi¯cant e®ect for the treatment group of interest, i.e., SB1
group when controlling for observable characteristics.
Possessing sandals/shoes is important not only to protect feet from cuts but also to pre-
vent other infections including parasites, and to improve speed and °exibility of movement
in an environment in which the poor largely travel on foot. A signi¯cant and substantial
positive e®ect is found when looking at the key SB1 group. The result also holds for the
SUP households comparison. The numerical magnitude of the treatment e®ect is slightly
smaller for SB1 compared with SUP, both in terms of absolute and normalized treatment
e®ects (see Tables 3a and 3b):
23There is now a large literature that interprets expenditure on feminine goods as an indicator of women's
intra-household bargaining power. See, for example, Deaton (1989).
22(5.2) Di®erence-in-Di®erence Matching Approach (DIDM)
The estimates reported in Tables 3a and 3b and discussed in the preceding section
provide us with robust evidence on the treatment e®ect of TUP program participation.
The results, however, rely on two restrictive assumptions: (i) the selection on observables
is adequately controlled for by the postulated linear e®ects of the variables included in
the DID regressions (i.e., the vector X02), and (ii) selection on unobservables is not strong
enough to dominate the estimated treatment e®ects. However, as widely discussed in
the literature, both of these assumptions may not be tenable in many applications. The
DIDM approach gets around the ¯rst problem by using matching techniques to control for
selection on observables. As mentioned earlier, the DIDM approach still relies on selection
on observables for identi¯cation and thus assumes implicitly that the degree of selection on
unobservables is not signi¯cant. In this section, we ¯rst report the estimated treatment
e®ects from the DIDM approach and then provide evidence on the importance of selection
on unobservables using sensitivity analysis.
A critical step in implementing the DIDM approach is to choose an appropriate set
of observable characteristics that are likely to be important in determining the selection
into treatment and may also a®ect the outcome variables. As discussed before, we need
to consider two levels of selection: BRAC's selection process and also the participation
decisions of the households. We thus use observables that re°ect these two levels of selection
problems for matching. To account for the BRAC selection process we use the set of
inclusion criteria. We also include indicators of a household's physical and human capital
(for example, land owned, household size, BMI and age of the household head, and an
indicator of women working as day laborers). As emphasized recently by Emran, Morshed
23and Stiglitz (2007), and Emran, Shilpi, and Stiglitz (2008), the outside option of a household
and thus the net return they get from participation in the TUP or other NGO programs
depends on the nature of labor market interactions and the shadow value of labor, especially
of women's labor. We thus include household size as an indicator of labor endowment of
the household, and the variable \day labor" as a measure of labor market participation by
women. We also include \land owned," as it is a crucial variable for the determination of
the shadow price of labor and also whether a woman is excluded from critical markets such
as the formal credit market and the labor market. All of the matching variables are from
the 2002 baseline survey.
Table 4a reports the estimated treatment e®ects from the DIDM estimator; and the
corresponding normalized treatment e®ects are reported in Table 4b. The results are, in
general, consistent with the conclusions reached above on the basis of the DID approach.
The estimated treatment e®ects vary depending on the matching algorithm used, but they
are, in general, con¯ned within reasonably tight bounds. For example, consider the es-
timated treatment e®ect on food security as measured by \food availability" and able to
take \two meals a day". The intervals of the estimated treatment e®ects in the case of the
SB1 treatment group are [0.26, 0.27] and [0.40, 0.41] for food availability and two meals a
day respectively. The estimate from the general DID regression is 0.24 (food availability)
and 0.42 (two meals a day). The corresponding intervals in case of the treatment group
SUP are [0.25, 0.26] and [0.38, 0.40] respectively, while the estimates from the general DID
are 0.25 and 0.42. Interestingly, the estimated treatment e®ect on grain stock is somewhat
larger and statistically more signi¯cant according to the DIDM approach compared to the
DID estimates if we focus on the most general speci¯cation. With respect to the asset
24variables, the estimates from DIDM are roughly the same as those from DID regressions.
The DIDM results, however, contradict the earlier conclusion that for the SUP treatment
group, there is signi¯cant positive e®ect of program participation on the ratio of saris to
lungis which can be viewed as an indicator of women's relative bargaining power within
the household. Along the same lines, the DIDM estimator shows no signi¯cant e®ect (both
numerically and statistically) on ownership of homestead land, which was about [0.08, 0.10]
in the general DID regression.
(5.3) How Does Selection on Unobservables A®ect the Results?
Evidence from Sensitivity Analysis
The evidence presented above in Tables 3a-3b, and 4a-4b does not take into account
the implications of potential selection on time variying unobservables for the estimated
treatment e®ects. In this section, we present Rosenbaum bounds on the estimated treat-
ment e®ects to provide evidence on the importance of selection on unobservables using
the methodology developed by Aakvik (2001), DiPrete and Gangl (2004) and Becker and
Caliendo (2007). Table 5 presents the results from the sensitivity analysis for key outcome
variables. We concentrate on the outcome variables that indicate signi¯cant program ef-
fects according to the DIDM estimates in Table 4a. For the binary outcome variables, we
present Mantel-Haenszel statistics (see Becker and Caliendo (2007) for details). There are
two test statistics: Qmh+ is the Mantel-Haenszel statistic under the assumption that the
estimated treatment e®ect is overestimated (relevant when the expected treatment e®ect
is positive), and Qmh¡ under the assumption that the estimated treatment e®ect is under-
estimated (relevant when the expected treatment e®ect is negative). In the context of our
25analysis, the worry is that the positive treatment e®ects reported in Tables 3a and 4a may
be spurious because of upward bias if there is positive selection on unobservables. So we
report only the Qmh+ statistic and the associated P-values Pmh+ in Table 5. For contin-
uous outcome variables, we present Wilcoxon signrank tests that give the upper and lower
bounds on signi¯cance of the treatment e®ects for a given level of selection on unobservables
(i.e., hidden bias). The results show that the estimated program impact on net income and
food security (food availability, grain stock and \two meals a day") are robust to allowing
for a signi¯cant level of selection on unobservables irrespective of the treatment group. This
can be seen from the P-values of the relevant Mantel-Haenszel statistics (i.e., the Pmh+)
for di®erent levels of selection on unobservables represented by di®erent values of Gamma.
For example, when the odds of participation is 50 percent higher (i.e., Gamma=1.50) for
the treatment group,24 the Pmh+ is 0.01 or less for net income, food availability and two
meals a day for both the treatment groups providing strong evidence that the estimated
treatment e®ects cannot be driven by selection on unobservables. In case of grain stocks,
the program impact for SB1 stays signi¯cant at 5 percent level at Gamma=1.30. For some
outcome variables such as number of saris and having a roof made of tin, the program im-
pact becomes insigni¯cant for the ultra-poor group ( SB1) in the presence of even a small
amount of selection on unobservables, although the estimated program e®ects survive for
the BRAC treatment group SUP.25
For the sensitivity analysis for the asset outcome variables, we use a dummy variable
24This implies unusually strong selection on unobservables.
25We note the caveat that this cannot be taken as de¯nitive evidence against a program impact on the
SB1, as we have no way to determine if there is actually signi¯cant selection on unobservables. One can
interpret this evidence as implying that even if there is a low degree of selection on unobservables for the
SB1 group, then the evidence in favor of a program impact is not strong.
26that equals one when the change in the stock of assets at the end of the period is strictly
positive (i.e., 2005-2002). We then present the relevant Mantel-Haenszel statistics. For
the number of cow/bulls, goat/sheep, and quilts/blankets, the estimated program e®ects
survive when we allow for very strong selection on unobservables (Gamma=2.0) for the
ultra-poor group SB1 and also for the BRAC treatment group SUP. Moreover, the change
in number of tubewells survive even if there is signi¯cant selection on unobservables for
both the SUP and SB1 groups (when Gamma=1.30, signi¯cant at 1 percent for SB1 and
at 3 percent for SUP). The change in ¯shnets, big trees, rickshaws, bicycles, chair/tables,
beds and radio/TV become insigni¯cant with a small amount of selection on unobservables.
(5.4) Heterogeneity in the Treatment E®ects on Income
Table 6 reports the results from estimating the DID speci¯cations (1)-(3) in the text
using quantile regressions focusing on household net income. This gives us a way to
provide some evidence on possible variations in the treatment e®ects on income across
the distribution.26 There are plausible theoretical reasons to expect that households who
start at lower initial conditions may bene¯t less from the TUP program participation, at
least in absolute terms. In principle this can be due to threshold e®ects and the myriad
of interlocking constraints that create and sustain poverty traps for the poorest of the
poor. If, on the other hand, one entertains a standard \neoclassical" view with concave
production functions satisfying the Inada conditions, we would expect that the poorest of
the poor would bene¯t the most (i.e., the conditional convergence across households).
The estimated treatment e®ects on the outcome variable `change in net income over
26QDID has been used recently by Song and Manchester (2007), among others.
27the last year' by QDID are reported in Table 6 for three di®erent speci¯cations of the DID
model used in Table 3a for both SB1 and SUP groups. The most striking conclusion that
holds across the board is that the income gains from the TUP program participation is
much less for the households in the bottom two deciles compared to the households in the
top two deciles of the distribution. Also, according to the estimates, the treatment e®ect
is not statistically signi¯cant for the households in the lowest decile for both the SB1 and
SUP, which reinforces the conclusion that the poorest of the ultra-poor seems to be facing
additional constraints. A second interesting pattern is that the magnitude of the program
e®ect goes down across the distribution when we control for selection on observables, and
the role of the observable characteristics seems to be stronger for the households in the
lower tail of the distribution.
Conclusions:
Using a two-period household level panel data set, this paper provides robust evidence
on the e®ects of the ¯rst phase of the TUP program in Bangladesh on a set of important
household outcomes for the ultra-poor. We use the errors in assignment in BRAC's selec-
tion to create alternative treatment and comparison groups. This allows us to identify a
treatment group composed of the poorest of the poor (i.e., ultra-poor) among the sample
households and also an appropriate comparison group for the treatment group. A rich
set of econometric approaches are used to estimate the average treatment e®ect on treated
(ATT) that takes into account both `selection on observables' and `selection on unobserv-
ables'. The results show that there is signi¯cant impact of program participation on net
income, food security, ownership of livestock and household durables such as tubewells and
28blankets/quilts of the ultra-poor households. The evidence also indicates that the TUP
program may not have any signi¯cant e®ects on health related outcomes, women's empow-
erment as measured by the ratio of saris (women's dress) to lungis (male clothing), and on
the ownership of homestead land and other productive assets examined such as ¯shing nets
and rickshaw/van. The estimates from the quantile di®erence in di®erence approach show
that the lowest two deciles of ultra-poor households reap much lower income gains com-
pared with the households in the top two deciles. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
¯rst analysis of the treatment e®ects of the widely acclaimed TUP program in Bangladesh
with careful considerations of selection issues; and we provide robust evidence on its e®ects
on ultra-poor households.
Appendix 1: Creating Variables for the Errors in Assignment
Analysis
Initial eligibility for people living in poverty to join the program is based upon selection
at a meeting of the village, which designates individuals in the lower two socioeconomic
strata; but among those selected as potentially eligible ultra-poor by the village, the NGO
then selects participants according to three exclusion criteria and the presence of at least
3 out of 5 inclusion criteria (Noor et al 2004, p. ix, BRAC Annual Report 2007). The
exclusion criteria are ECI (the individual is not a member of another NGO), EC2 (the
individual is not a recipient of a government welfare food distribution program, and EC3
(there is no female able to work in the household. We created our own designation of
those eligible using the survey data. To do so for the case of NGO membership we used
29the responses to: i) whether the person had NGO savings (variable \ngos" - selected 340
observations); ii) whether the person had a loan from an NGO (variable \ngoln" - selected
64 observations); iii) whether the materials for the house wall and roof were provided by an
NGO { tins1=3, (selected 32 observations); iv) whether the source of a loan was from an
NGO (variable srln { selected 1 observation), and v) whether the individual was recorded
as either a member of the BRAC Development Program or indicated as a member of more
than one NGO (selecting 100 and 23 observations respectively). This classi¯cation selected
447 observations for the year 2002, of which 57 had been selected as SUP members for the
program despite apparent ineligibility.
Exclusion criterion 2 was composed of the following variables: i) whether the person had
government bene¯ts (gprben1=2), which selected 30 observations; ii) whether main source
of income was government bene¯ts, in main source of income, for three primary sources
(variables msoi1, msoi2, msoi3), which selected 3, 11 and 7 observations respectively. This
classi¯cation selected 127 observations, of which 38 had been selected as SUP members for
the program.
To create EC3 we used the variable disab1, those women who presented a disability.
This selected 48 observations, of which 24 previously had been selected as SUP members.
Overall, according to the exclusion criteria, we identi¯ed 116 participants who were selected
despite being ineligible.
With respect to the inclusion criteria, the household had to meet at least three out of
¯ve conditions in order to be considered for the TUP program. They were: IC1: owning less
than 10 decimals of land (a tenth of an acre), including homestead; IC2: no male income
earner at home; IC3 children of school-age working; IC4: adult women of household selling
30labor outside homestead; and IC5: household having no productive assets.
With respect to the ¯rst inclusion criterion (ownership of less than 10 decimals of land,
including for their homestead), we created a dummy variable for whether the household
owns self cultivated land, own lands that others cultivate, own homestead land, or owns
land that is uncultivated. This criterion selects (as eligible) 4624 out of the 5067 for the
year 2002.
For the second inclusion criterion, no male income earner present at home, we ¯rst
created a dummy variable for the presence of no male income earner at home, as the
intersection of males of working age (more than 14 years old) that are not working. There
are 66 observations that ful¯ll this criterion, of which 27 already had been selected as SUP.
The second auxiliary variable constructed was a dummy for the presence of no male at home
(additional to the previous one, no male earner). This variable selects 1893 observations,
of which 1147 had been selected for SUP participation.
For the third inclusion variable, that school-age children are working, we used question-
naire data to that e®ect, which selected 167 observations, of which 81 had been selected as
an SUP.
To parallel the fourth inclusion criterion, that there are adult women selling labor out-
side the homestead, we selected those observations for which the main source of income
(for the ¯rst three primary occupations) were: 5 =daylabor (agriculture), 6=daylabor (non-
agriculture), 7=small business/trading, 9=begging, 10=servant, 11=professional. This se-
lected 1627 observations, of which 1047 had been already selected as SUP.
For the ¯fth inclusion criterion that the household had no productive assets, we used the
dummy variable \prodasst", which selected 2791 observations, of which 1614 were already
31SUP members.
Finally, to construct the inclusion criteria, we consider those observations that ful¯ll at
least three out of the ¯ve conditions. According to these data, there were 1760 observations
that should have been classi¯ed as SUP, of which 647 were not.
According to the exclusion and inclusion criteria, we have created the following groups:
SB1 (selected as SUP, and ful¯lling both inclusion and exclusion criteria, 994 households),
SB0 (not selected as SUP, but ful¯lling criteria, 575 households) SNB1 (selected as SUP,
not ful¯lling the criteria, 1381 households), and SNB0 (correctly not selected as SUP,
criteria not met, 2117 households).
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34Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Year Mean Std. Dev. N
Increase in net income 2002 9170.852 7899.869 5067
2005 16279.711 10845.05 5067
Own homestead land 2002 0.543 0.498 5067
2005 0.528 0.499 5067
Roof made of tin 2002 0.353 0.478 5067
2005 0.614 0.487 5067
Number of cow/bulls 2002 0.114 0.513 5067
2005 0.945 1.208 5067
Number of goat/sheep 2002 0.114 0.486 5067
2005 0.344 0.973 5067
Number of duck/hens 2002 1.147 2.833 5067
2005 2.526 3.687 5067
Number of ﬁshing nets 2002 0.002 0.054 5067
2005 0.150 0.603 5067
Number of big trees 2002 0.891 5.971 5067
2005 0.610 2.760 5067
Number of rickshaw/vans 2002 0.031 0.271 5067
2005 0.075 0.278 5067
Number of bicycles 2002 0.006 0.079 5067
2005 0.017 0.148 5067
Number of chair/tables 2002 0.368 0.8 5067
2005 0.646 1.051 5067
Number of beds 2002 0.883 0.726 5067
2005 1.138 0.764 5067
Number of radio/TVs 2002 0.014 0.12 5067
2005 0.03 0.176 5067
Number of quilt/blankets 2002 0.033 0.214 5067
2005 0.161 0.444 5067
Number of tubewells 2002 0.027 0.163 5067
2005 0.451 0.498 5067
Food availability 2002 0.059 0.235 5067
2005 0.238 0.426 5067
Meals twice a day 2002 0.601 0.49 5067
2005 0.403 0.491 5067
Grain stocks (kg) 2002 0.000 0.000 5067
2005 1.661 17.824 5067
Health status 2002 0.423 0.494 5067
2005 0.551 0.497 5067
Health improvement 2002 0.495 0.500 5067
2005 0.629 0.483 5067
Number of saris 2002 1.811 0.588 5067
2005 2.210 0.820 5067
Ratio sari lungi 2002 1.109 0.427 3627
2005 1.025 0.358 3514
Do you have shoes? 2002 0.624 0.485 5067
2005 0.898 0.302 5067
Increase in net income: Summary variable to the answer of “Last year employment and
income related information - Increased net income/asset in tk” for the TUP member. Own
homestead land: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the HH owns homestead land. Roof made
of tin: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the material of household main living room is tin. Food
availability: Dummy variable that equals 1 one the answer to the following question is 3 or 4:
What would you say the status of your HH is in terms of food availability? Always deﬁcit[1],
deﬁcit some times [2], neither deﬁcit nor surplus [3], food surplus [4]. Meals twice a day:
Dummy variable equal to 1 when the answer to the following question is yes: Could your HH
aﬀord two meals per day most of the time during last year? Health status: Dummy variable
that equals 1 if the answer is 1 to 3: How do you perceive your current health status? Excellent
[1],V e r yg o o d[2],G o o d[3],F a i r[4],P o o r / B a d[5]. Health improvement: Dummy variable
that equals 1 if the answer to the following question is 1 to 3: How do you consider your health
compared to last year? Much better than one year ago [1]; somewhat better now [2];a b o u tt h e
same [3], somewhat worse [4];m u c hw o r s e[5]. Do you have shoes? Answer to the question
“Do all HH members have shoes/sandals?” yes[1] no[0].
1Table 2a: Test of diﬀerence in mean characteristics between
treatment and control groups in 2002
sb1 − sb0 sup − nsup snb1 − snb0 sb1 − snb0
Increase in net income 162.88*** 1924.30*** 1362.89** 5289.85***
(247.30) (221.40) (296.29) (289.00)
Own homestead land 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.26***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Roof made of tin 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of cow/bulls 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of goat/sheeps 0.01 0.04*** 0.03** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of duck/hens 0.05 0.57*** 0.66*** 0.88***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
Number of ﬁshing nets 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00*
( 0.00 ) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of big trees 0.27*** 0.74*** 0.82*** 1.02***
(0.12) (0.17) (0.24) (0.28)
Number of rickshaw/vans -0.01 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of bicycles 0.01 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Number of chair/tables 0.11*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.45***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Number of beds 0.12*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.50***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Number of radio/TVs 0.00 0.01*** 0.01** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Number of quilt/blankets 0.00 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of tubewells 0.01 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Food availability 0.02** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Meals twice a day 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.22***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Grain stocks (kg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Health status 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.09***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Health improvement -0.06** -0.01 -0.02 0.07***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of saris 0.06** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.22***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ratio saris/lungis -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Do you have shoes? 0.07** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.10***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Body mass index 0.04 0.14 0.27 0.58***
(0.16) (0.14) (0.38) (0.22)
Household size -0.03 0.24*** -0.10** 1.50***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Working -0.05*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 3.89 -0.25 -0.49 -3.92***
(0.69) (0.36) (0.43) (0.48)
Can you read and 0.00 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.09***
write a letter? (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Average years of schooling -0.02 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.15***
in the household (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p<0.01,∗∗p<0.05,∗p<0.1
2Table 2b: Mean values of outcome variables in 2002
for diﬀerent treatment groups
sb1 sup snb1
Increase in net income 5860.19 8150.42 9787.95
Own homestead land 0.39 0.47 0.53
Roof made of tin 0.30 0.31 0.32
Number of cow/bulls 0.01 0.04 0.05
Number of goat/sheeps 0.06 0.09 0.12
Number of duck/hens 0.71 0.84 0.93
Number of ﬁshing nets 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of big trees 0.38 0.50 0.58
Number of rickshaw/vans 0.02 0.02 0.02
Number of bicycles 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of chair/tables 0.14 0.21 0.25
Number of beds 0.69 0.74 0.78
Number of radio/TVs 0.00 0.01 0.01
Number of quilt/blankets 0.01 0.02 0.02
Number of tubewells 0.02 0.01 0.01
Food availability 0.02 0.02 0.03
Meals twice a day 0.48 0.51 0.52
Grain stocks (kg) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Health status 0.35 0.42 0.47
Health improvement 0.45 0.50 0.54
Number of saris 1.69 1.73 1.76
Ratio saris/lungis 1.10 1.11 1.11
Do you have shoes? 0.58 0.57 0.55
3Table 3a: Impact of program on each treatment group and for each outcome
(1): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a2 ∗ dT + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
(2): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a1R ∗ (d05 ∗ dR)+a1K ∗ (d05 ∗ dK)+a2 ∗ dT + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
(3): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a1R ∗ (d05 ∗ dR)+a1K ∗ (d05 ∗ dK)+a2 ∗ dT + X0
02Π + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
sb1 sup
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Income and assets
Increase in net income 3,870.40*** 3,753.00*** 3,131.21*** 3,097.09*** 3,190.48*** 2,941.59***
(510.07) (504.32) (617.25) (377.19) (374.05) (591.02)
Own homestead land 0.09** 0.09** 0.08 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Roof made of tin 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Livestock
Number of cow/bulls 1.68*** 1.69*** 1.63*** 1.74*** 1.75*** 1.70***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Number of goat/sheeps 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.45***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Number of duck/hens 0.68*** 0.65*** 0.69*** 0.66*** 0.70*** 0.69***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.27) (0.13) (0.13) (0.23)
Productive assets
Number of ﬁshing nets 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.03* -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of big trees 0.35** 0.34** 0.28 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.75***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21)
Number of rickshaw/vans 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Number of bicycles 0.00 0.00 -0.02** 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.00 0.00 (0.01)
Household Durable Goods
Number of chair/tables 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.18** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.17***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Number of beds 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Number of radio/TVs 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of quilt/blankets 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Number of tubewells 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Food security
Food availability 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.25***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Meals twice a day 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.42***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Grain stocks (kg) 2.15** 2.06** 3.18* 1.28** 1.30*** 2.17
(1.03) (1.02) (1.64) (0.50) (0.50) (1.42)
Health outcomes
Health status 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Health improvement 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04* 0.04* 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Women’s empowerment
Number of saris 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Ratio saris/lungis 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.03* 0.03* 0.11*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Other
Do you have shoes? 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p<0.01,∗∗p<0.05,∗p<0.1
Note: marginal eﬀects from probit regression for dummy variables, OLS coeﬃcients for Increase in net income
(measured in Taka), Number of saris, ratio of saris to lungis, livestock, productive assets and furniture.
Yit is the outcome variable of interest for household i in year t, d05 is a dummy that equals 1 for the year 2005, and dT
is a dummy that equals 1 when household i belongs to an appropriately deﬁned treatment group (i.e., SB1; SUP)a n d
equals zero when a household belongs to the corresponding control group (i.e., SB0;NSUP). dR and dK are dummy
variables for Rangpur and Kurigram districts. X02 is a vector of controls in 2002. 4Table 3b: Ratio of treatment eﬀect to the group mean
for treatment groups in 2002
sb1 sup
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Income and assets
Increase in net income 0.66 0.64 0.53 0.38 0.39 0.36
Own homestead land 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.22
Roof made of tin 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.49 0.49
Livestock
Number of cow/bulls 168.26 168.57 163.29 43.61 43.65 42.59
Number of goat/sheeps 7.67 7.69 8.07 5.11 5.10 4.99
Number of duck/hens 0.95 0.91 0.98 0.79 0.83 0.82
Productive assets
Number of ﬁshing nets n/a n/a n/a 10.16 11.21 -9.09
Number of big trees 0.91 0.90 0.74 1.10 1.11 1.51
Number of rickshaw/vans 0.94 0.92 1.08 2.68 2.69 1.32
Number of bicycles -0.91 -0.99 -8.45 2.54 2.64 -5.22
Household Durable Goods
Number of chair/tables 1.14 1.10 1.29 0.52 0.54 0.81
Number of beds 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23
Number of radio/TVs 2.93 2.82 3.23 0.52 0.53 0.32
Number of quilt/blankets 22.70 22.39 19.89 8.24 8.30 8.24
Number of tubewells 9.07 9.09 8.30 6.14 6.20 8.66
Food security
Food availability 13.39 13.34 13.44 13.42 13.53 10.69
Meals twice a day 0.76 0.76 0.87 0.72 0.74 0.84
Grain stocks (kg) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Health outcomes
Health status 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.09
Health improvement 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.02
Women’s empowerment
N u m b e r o f s a r i s0 . 1 70 . 1 70 . 1 8 0.17 0.17 0.17
Ratio saris/lungis 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.10
Other
D o y o u h a v e s h o e s ?0 . 1 80 . 1 80 . 2 3 0.27 0.27 0.24
5Table 4a: Estimated treatment eﬀects from DIDM estimator
sb1 sup
radius nearest 2 kernel radius nearest 2 kernel
caliper neighbors caliper neighbors
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Income and assets
Increase in net income 3329.33*** 3562.72*** 3323.82*** 3075.45*** 3529.33*** 3049.56***
(589.42) (659.30) (590.98) (614.18) (692.36) (616.82)
Own homestead land 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Roof made of tin 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.12***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Livestock
Number of cow/bulls 1.60*** 1.62*** 1.60*** 1.64*** 1.64*** 1.64***
(0.05) (0.14) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Number of goat/sheeps 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.45***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Number of duck/hens 0.69*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.67** 0.71*** 0.62***
(0.26) (0.30) (0.26) (0.23) (0.27) (0.23)
Productive assets
Number of ﬁshing nets 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Number of big trees 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.43* 0.25 0.37
(0.19) (0.23) (0.19) (0.27) (0.30) (0.27)
Number of rickshaw/vans 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of bicycles -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Household Durable Goods
Number of chair/tables 0.18*** 0.15** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.09 0.15***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Number of beds 0.16*** 0.13** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Number of radio/TVs 0.01** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of quilt/blankets 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Number of tubewells 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Food security
Food availability 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Meals twice a day 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.40***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Grain stocks (kg) 3.23*** 3.28*** 3.23*** 2.66** 2.71* 2.65**
(1.09) (1.10) (1.09) (1.38) (1.63) (1.39)
Health outcomes
Health status 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.12
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Health improvement 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Women’s empowerment
Number of saris O.32*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Ratio saris/lungis 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Other
Do you have shoes? 0.12*** 0.12** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.11***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p<0.01,∗∗p<0.05,∗p<0.1
DIDM stands for Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence estimation combined with matching. Matching on observables is based
on the following variables: all inclusion criteria, indicators of physical and human capital (for example, land
owned, household size, body mass index, age, and the indicator of women working as day laborers).
6Table 4b: Ratio of treatment eﬀect to the group mean (DIDM estimator)
sb1 sup
radius nearest 2 kernel radius nearest 2 kernel
caliper neighbors caliper neighbors
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Income and assets
Increase in net income 0.57 0.61 0.57 0.38 0.43 0.37
Own homestead land 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.05 -0.03 0.00
Roof made of tin 0.51 0.46 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.39
Livestock
Number of Cow/bull 168.90 170.99 168.91 46.99 46.78 46.96
Number of goat/sheeps 10.48 10.10 10.45 4.84 4.76 4.79
Number of duck/hens 1.46 1.41 1.42 0.79 0.84 0.74
Productive assets
Number of ﬁshing nets n/a n/a n/a -2.02 1.83 0.07
Number of big trees 0.45 0.23 0.43 0.86 0.49 0.74
Number of rickshaw/vans 1.22 0.00 1.38 0.95 1.35 0.96
Number of bicycles -2.68 -4.02 -2.13 -1.91 -3.43 -1.99
Household Durable Goods
Number of chair/tables 1.10 0.94 1.05 0.77 0.41 0.73
Number of beds 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19
Number of radio/TVs 2.97 3.76 2.82 1.05 0.74 0.87
Number of quilt/blankets 20.83 20.93 21.16 10.60 10.23 10.65
Number of tubewells 9.83 10.09 9.92 10.47 10.73 10.80
Food security
Food availability 13.89 17.22 15.00 11.31 10.87 10.87
Meals twice a day 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.76 0.78
Grain stocks (kg) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Health outcomes
Health status 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.10
Health improvement 0.14 0.11 0.13 -0.05 0.08 0.06
Women’s empowerment
Number of saris 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17
Ratio saris/lungis 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05
Other
Do you have shoes? 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.19
DIDM stands for Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence estimation combined with matching. Matching on observables is based
on the following variables: all inclusion criteria, indicators of physical and human capital (for example, land
owned, household size, body mass index, age, and the indicator of women working as day laborers).
7Table 5: Sensitivity analysis for selected outcomes
sb1 sup
Gamma Qmh+ pmh+ Qmh+ pmh+
Increase 1.00 2611.36 0.00 2434.58 0.00
in net 1.10 2311.56 0.00 2137.19 0.00
income 1.30 1806.53 0.00 1629.22 0.00
1.50 1387.82 0.00 1212.56 0.00
2.00 572.52 0.02 391.86 0.06
Roof 1.00 1.23 0.11 3.55 0.00
made of 1.10 0.90 0.18 2.80 0.00
tin 1.30 0.33 0.37 1.49 0.07
1.50 -0.12 0.55 0.37 0.35
2.00 0.87 0.19 1.75 0.04
Number of cow/bulls 1.00 22.95 0.00 26.77 0.00
1.10 22.22 0.00 25.96 0.00
1.30 20.95 0.00 24.56 0.00
1.50 19.90 0.00 23.40 0.00
2.00 17.92 0.00 21.17 0.00
Number of goat/sheeps 1.00 7.42 0.00 8.10 0.00
1.10 6.98 0.00 7.55 0.00
1.30 6.22 0.00 6.61 0.00
1.50 5.60 0.00 5.82 0.00
2.00 4.40 0.00 4.31 0.00
Number of duck/hens 1.00 2.50 0.01 2.73 0.00
1.10 1.83 0.03 1.93 0.03
1.30 0.65 0.26 0.54 0.29
1.50 0.22 0.41 0.53 0.30
2.00 2.24 0.01 2.93 0.00
Number of ﬁshing nets 1.00 0.59 0.28 0.62 0.27
1.10 0.91 0.18 1.01 0.16
1.30 1.47 0.07 1.69 0.05
1.50 1.96 0.03 2.29 0.01
2.00 2.97 0.00 3.52 0.00
Number of big trees 1.00 1.16 0.12 0.93 0.18
1.10 0.72 0.24 0.40 0.34
1.30 -0.05 0.52 0.34 0.37
1.50 0.49 0.31 1.12 0.13
2.00 1.81 0.03 2.73 0.00
Number of rickshaw/vans 1.00 1.79 0.04 2.16 0.02
1.10 1.57 0.06 1.89 0.03
1.30 1.20 0.11 1.42 0.08
1.50 0.89 0.19 1.02 0.15
2.00 0.27 0.39 0.24 0.40
Number of bicycles 1.00 0.33 0.37 1.13 0.13
1.10 0.42 0.34 1.28 0.10
1.30 0.59 0.28 1.54 0.06
1.50 0.73 0.23 1.77 0.04
2.00 1.04 0.15 2.26 0.01
For increase in net income, we present Wilcoxon signrank tests that give the upper and lower bounds on
signiﬁcance of the treatment eﬀects for a given level of selection on unobservables (i.e., hidden bias). In each
other case, dummy variable that equals one if the change in the period was positive. Qmh+ is the
Mantel-Haenszel statistic under the assumption that the estimated treatment eﬀect is overestimated (relevant
when the expected treatment eﬀect is positive). The corresponding P-values is reported as pmh+.
8Table 5 cont.: Sensitivity analysis for selected outcomes
sb1 sup
Gamma Qmh+ pmh+ Qmh+ pmh+
Number of chair/tables 1.00 1.72 0.04 1.73 0.04
1.10 1.19 0.12 1.09 0.14
1.30 0.27 0.39 -0.02 0.51
1.50 0.33 0.37 0.82 0.20
2.00 1.92 0.03 2.75 0.00
Number of beds 1.00 1.63 0.05 2.41 0.01
1.10 1.00 0.16 1.68 0.05
1.30 -0.06 0.52 0.40 0.34
1.50 0.88 0.19 0.56 0.29
2.00 2.78 0.00 2.76 0.00
Number of radio/TVs 1.00 1.33 0.09 -0.16 0.56
1.10 1.21 0.11 -0.08 0.53
1.30 1.00 0.16 0.29 0.39
1.50 0.82 0.21 0.61 0.27
2.00 0.48 0.32 1.26 0.10
Number of quilt/blankets 1.00 6.64 0.00 6.81 0.00
1.10 6.22 0.00 6.28 0.00
1.30 5.49 0.00 5.37 0.00
1.50 4.89 0.00 4.60 0.00
2.00 3.74 0.00 3.12 0.00
Number of tubewells 1.00 3.91 0.00 3.87 0.00
1.10 3.28 0.00 3.12 0.00
1.30 2.19 0.01 1.82 0.03
1.50 1.26 0.10 0.71 0.24
2.00 0.44 0.33 1.39 0.08
Food 1.00 8.15 0.00 7.79 0.00
availability 1.10 8.66 0.00 8.42 0.00
1.30 9.56 0.00 9.54 0.00
1.50 10.36 0.00 10.52 0.00
2.00 12.05 0.00 12.58 0.00
Meals 1.00 3.25 0.00 6.54 0.00
twice a 1.10 3.00 0.00 6.00 0.00
day 1.30 2.56 0.01 5.08 0.00
1.50 2.19 0.01 4.31 0.00
2.00 1.48 0.07 2.80 0.00
Grain stocks (kg) 1.00 2.02 0.02 2.07 0.02
1.10 1.88 0.03 1.88 0.03
1.30 1.64 0.05 1.56 0.06
1.50 1.44 0.08 1.30 0.10
2.00 1.06 0.15 0.79 0.22
Number of saris 1.00 0.98 0.16 3.95 0.00
1.10 0.67 0.25 3.25 0.00
1.30 0.12 0.45 2.01 0.02
1.50 0.05 0.48 0.96 0.17
2.00 0.99 0.16 1.01 0.16
Ratio 1.00 0.15 0.44 1.18 0.12
sari/ 1.10 0.10 0.46 1.07 0.14
lungi 1.30 0.02 0.49 0.88 0.19
1.50 -0.05 0.52 0.71 0.24
2.00 -0.20 0.58 0.39 0.35
Do you 1.00 1.75 0.04 3.78 0.00
have 1.10 1.43 0.08 3.03 0.00
shoes? 1.30 0.86 0.20 1.71 0.04
1.50 0.37 0.36 0.59 0.28
2.00 0.31 0.38 1.54 0.06
In each case, dummy variable that equals one if the change in the period was positive. Qmh+ is the
Mantel-Haenszel statistic under the assumption that the estimated treatment eﬀect is overestimated (relevant
when the expected treatment eﬀect is positive). The corresponding P − values is reported as pmh+.
9Table 6 - Quantile DID, increase in net income
(1): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a2 ∗ dT + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
(2): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a1R ∗ (d05 ∗ dR)+a1K ∗ (d05 ∗ dK)+a2 ∗ dT + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
(3): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a1R ∗ (d05 ∗ dR)+a1K ∗ (d05 ∗ dK)+a2 ∗ dT + X0
02Π + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9
sb1
(1) 1,310.00** 1,830.00*** 2,120.00*** 2,239.00*** 2,385.00*** 2,300.00*** 2,265.00*** 2,178.00*** 2,460.00***
(514.98) (354.38) (325.83) (346.32) (278.64) (275.61) (295.76) (375.26) (392.54)
(2) 1,510.00*** 1,610.00*** 1,950.00*** 1,879.00*** 2,010.00*** 1,665.00*** 1,790.00*** 2,030.00*** 2,210.00***
(567.76) (418.97) (405.36) (416.14) (402.05) (434.50) (423.06) (435.39) (434.01)
(3) 836.36 1,530.96*** 1,021.99** 1,040.96** 1,378.76*** 1,553.24*** 1,697.76*** 2,134.73*** 2,305.76***
(693.43) (550.71) (498.36) (462.21) (343.06) (399.76) (454.20) (478.78) (443.17)
sup
(1) 1,470.00*** 1,890.00*** 2,070.00*** 2,050.00*** 2,310.00*** 2,190.00*** 2,370.00*** 2,560.00*** 2,580.00***
(292.04) (209.24) (273.92) (253.29) (392.07) (325.33) (342.92) (331.26) (349.09)
(2) 1,560.00*** 1,500.00*** 1,680.00*** 1,920.00*** 2,330.00*** 2,220.00*** 2,420.00*** 2,415.00*** 2,430.00***
(335.55) (230.03) (294.87) (359.59) (244.88) (255.53) (223.52) (284.64) (286.74)
(3) 817.35 1,074.65* 854.36* 1,208.39** 1,480.20*** 1,671.56*** 1,938.12*** 2,204.53*** 2,219.56***
(725.64) (549.86) (508.96) (489.31) (490.32) (458.71) (513.87) (556.27) (521.38)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p<0.01,∗∗p<0.05,∗p<0.1
Yit is the outcome variable ‘increase in net income for household’ i in year t, d05 is a dummy that equals 1 for
the year 2005, and dT is a dummy that equals 1 when household i belongs to an appropriately deﬁned
treatment group (i.e., SB1; SUP) and equals zero when a household belongs to the corresponding control group
(i.e., SB0;NSUP). dR and dK are dummy variables for Rangpur and Kurigram districts. X02 is a vector of
controls in 2002.
10APPENDIX TABLES (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Table A.3a: Impact of program on SNB1 group
(1): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a2 ∗ dT + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
(2): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a1R ∗ (d05 ∗ dR)+a1K ∗ (d05 ∗ dK)
+a2 ∗ dT + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
(3): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a1R ∗ (d05 ∗ dR)+a1K ∗ (d05 ∗ dK)
+a2 ∗ dT + X0




Increase in net income 3,514.86*** 3,757.73*** 1,626.53
(484.70) (480.61) (1,843.86)
Own homestead land 0.07*** 0.07*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.10)
Roof made of tin 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.17*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.10)
Livestock
Number of Cow/bulls 1.78*** 1.78*** 1.93***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.14)
Number of goat/sheeps 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.33**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.14)
Number of duck/hens 0.72*** 0.82*** 0.23
(0.17) (0.17) (0.53)
Productive assets
Number of ﬁshing nets 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Number of big trees 0.54** 0.55** 1.27
(0.26) (0.27) (0.86)
Number of rickshaw/vans 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Number of bicycles 0.01 0.01* -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Household Durable Goods
Number of chair/tables 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14
(0.05) (0.05) (0.17)
Number of beds 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.11
(0.04) (0.04) (0.13)
Number of radio/TVs 0.01 0.01 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Number of quilt/blankets 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
Number of tubewells 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Food security
Food availability 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.17*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.10)
Meals twice a day 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.43***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Grain stocks (kg) 0.93 0.94 -1.77
(0.59) (0.59) (3.54)
Health outcomes
Health status 0.01 0.01 0.14
(0.02) (0.02) (0.10)
Health improvement 0.03 0.03 -0.09
(0.02) (0.02) (0.10)
Women’s empowerment
Number of saris 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.26*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.12)
Ratio saris/lungis 0.03 0.03 0.21*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.12)
Other
Do you have shoes? 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.12*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p<0.01,∗∗p<0.05,∗p<0.1
Note: marginal eﬀects from probit regression for dummy variables, OLS coeﬃcients for Increase in net income
(measured in Taka), Number of saris, ratio of saris to lungis, livestock, productive assets and furniture.
Yit is the outcome variable of interest for household i in year t, d05 is a dummy that equals 1 for the year 2005, and dT
is a dummy that equals 1 when household i belongs to SNB1 and equals zero when a household belongs to the
corresponding control group, SNB0. dR and dK are dummy variables for Rangpur and Kurigram districts. X02 is a
vector of controls in 2002.
11Table A.3b: Ratio of treatment eﬀect to the mean




Increase in net income 0.36 0.38 0.17
Own homestead land 0.13 0.14 -0.02
Roof made of tin 0.44 0.51 0.54
Livestock
Number of cow/bulls 33.14 33.20 36.03
Number of goat/sheeps 3.96 3.97 2.85
Number of duck/hens 0.77 0.87 0.25
Productive assets
Number of ﬁshing nets 17.35 19.20 7.23
Number of big trees 0.93 0.95 2.19
Number of rickshaw/vans 3.87 3.94 2.70
Number of bicycles 3.65 3.85 -6.10
Household Durable Goods
Number of chair/tables 0.50 0.54 0.55
Number of beds 0.27 0.29 0.14
Number of radio/TVs 0.68 0.71 -0.67
Number of quilt/blankets 6.45 6.60 2.53
Number of tubewells 8.98 9.21 5.29
Food security
Food availability 12.36 12.72 6.18
Meals twice a day 0.71 0.73 0.82
Grain stocks (kg) n/a n/a n/a
Health outcomes
Health status 0.02 0.02 0.30
Health improvement 0.06 0.06 -0.17
Women’s empowerment
Number of saris 0.17 0.18 0.15
Ratio saris/lungis 0.02 0.03 0.19
Other
Do you have shoes? 0.33 0.33 0.21
12Table A.4a: Estimated treatment eﬀects from DIDM estimator
snb1




Increase in net income 1638.47* 593.24 1664.83
(1638.06) (1711.19) (1697.27)
Own homestead land -0.15*** -0.15** -0.18***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Roof made of tin 0.11* 0.11 0.10
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
Livestock
Number of cow/bulls 1.90*** 1.96*** 1.89***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
Number of goat/sheeps 0.31** 0.35** 0.30**
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Number of duck/hens 0.25 0.45 0.20
(0.53) (0.59) (0.54)
Productive assets
Number of ﬁshing nets 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Number of big trees 0.57 0.08 0.58
(0.73) (0.42) (0.77)
Number of rickshaw/vans 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Number of bicycles -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Household Durable Goods
Number of chair/tables 0.12 0.10 0.11
(0.14) (0.18) (0.14)
Number of beds 0.08 0.14 0.08
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Number of radio/TVs 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Number of quilt/blankets 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Number of tubewells 0.08 0.02 0.09
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Food security
Food availability 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Meals twice a day 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.40***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
Grain stocks (kg) -1.88 -1.90 -1.46
(2.90) (5.98) (3.10)
Health outcomes
Health status 0.16 0.11 0.13
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
Health improvement -0.09 -0.07 -0.09
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Women’s empowerment
Number of saris 0.23 0.20 0.23
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Ratio saris/lungis 0.29* 0.33 0.35***
(0.16) (0.19) (0.17)
Other
Do you have shoes? 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p<0.01,∗∗p<0.05,∗p<0.1
DIDM stands for Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence estimation combined with matching. Matching on observables is based
on the following variables: all inclusion criteria, indicators of physical and human capital (for example, land
owned, household size, body mass index, age, and the indicator of women working as day laborers).
13Table A.4b: Ratio of treatment eﬀect to the group mean
from DIDM estimator
snb1




Increase in net income 0.17 0.06 0.17
Own homestead land -0.29 -0.29 -0.34
Roof made of tin 0.36 0.34 0.32
Livestock
Number of cow/bulls 17.25 17.84 17.20
Number of goat/sheeps 1.34 1.51 1.31
Number of duck/hens 0.13 0.23 0.10
Productive assets
Number of ﬁshing nets 0.31 -0.63 0.53
Number of big trees 0.81 0.11 0.83
Number of rickshaw/vans 1.01 0.93 0.98
Number of bicycles -8.24 0.00 -4.20
Household Durable Goods
Number of chair/tables 0.34 0.28 0.31
Number of beds 0.08 0.15 0.09
Number of radio/TVs -0.21 -0.33 -0.21
Number of quilt/blankets 0.52 0.53 0.24
Number of tubewells 9.10 2.23 10.86
Food security
Food availability 7.22 8.30 7.20
Meals twice a day 0.75 0.74 0.77
Grain stocks (kg) n/a n/a n/a
Health outcomes
Health status 0.35 0.24 0.28
Health improvement -0.16 -0.13 -0.17
Women’s empowerment
Number of saris 0.13 0.11 0.13
Ratio saris/lungis 0.27 0.30 0.32
Other
Do you have shoes? 0.22 0.22 0.22
DIDM stands for Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence estimation combined with matching. Matching on observables is based
on the following variables: all inclusion criteria, indicators of physical and human capital (for example, land
owned, household size, body mass index, age, and the indicator of women working as day laborers).
14Table A.5:
Sensitivity analysis for selected outcomes, SNB
snb1
Gamma Qmh+ pmh+
Increase 1.00 1460.32 0.03
in net 1.10 1187.23 0.07
income 1.30 676.19 0.19
1.50 245.30 0.37
2.00 -587.81 0.77
Roof 1.00 3.16 0.00
made of 1.10 2.52 0.01
tin 1.30 1.42 0.08
1.50 0.48 0.32
2.00 1.26 0.10



































For increase in net income, we present Wilcoxon signrank tests that give the upper and lower bounds on
signiﬁcance of the treatment eﬀects for a given level of selection on unobservables (i.e., hidden bias). For the
other variables, Qmh+ is the Mantel-Haenszel statistic under the assumption that the estimated treatment eﬀect
is overestimated (relevant when the expected treatment eﬀect is positive). The corresponding P-values is
reported as pmh+.
15Table A.5 cont.:
Sensitivity analysis for selected outcomes, SNB
snb1
Gamma Qmh+ pmh+

























Food 1.00 0.88 0.19




Meals 1.00 5.07 0.00
twice a 1.10 4.62 0.00
day 1.30 3.84 0.00
1.50 3.19 0.00
2.00 1.93 0.03










Ratio 1.00 0.45 0.33
sari 1.10 0.35 0.36
lungi 1.30 0.17 0.43
1.50 0.02 0.49
2.00 -0.28 0.61
Do you 1.00 2.72 0.00
have 1.10 2.08 0.02
shoes? 1.30 0.96 0.17
1.50 0.00 0.50
2.00 1.78 0.04
In each case, dummy variable that equals one if the change in the period was positive. Qmh+ is the
Mantel-Haenszel statistic under the assumption that the estimated treatment eﬀect is overestimated (relevant
when the expected treatment eﬀect is positive). The corresponding P − values is reported as pmh+.
16Table A.6 - Quantile DID, increase in net income for SNB1
(1): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a2 ∗ dT + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
(2): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a1R ∗ (d05 ∗ dR)+a1K ∗ (d05 ∗ dK)+a2 ∗ dT + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
(3): Yit = a0 + a1 ∗ d05 + a1R ∗ (d05 ∗ dR)+a1K ∗ (d05 ∗ dK)+a2 ∗ dT + X0
02Π + β(dT ∗ d05)+eit
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9
snb1
(1) 2,100.00*** 2,430.00*** 2,460.00*** 2,470.00*** 2,870.00*** 2,680.00*** 2,625.00*** 2,550.00*** 2,240.00***
(568.76) (647.36) (730.25) (675.31) (647.30) (612.67) (637.53) (690.50) (572.06)
(2) 1,544.00** 2,470.00*** 2,320.00*** 2,535.00*** 2,770.00*** 2,968.00*** 2,995.00*** 2,860.00*** 2,680.00***
(649.57) (506.31) (575.99) (530.92) (557.23) (495.84) (586.89) (494.02) (474.40)
(3) 1,353.80** 1,137.28** 1,181.21** 1,250.18 1,167.45 1,326.26 1,513.32 1,162.80 1,597.69
(631.82) (561.00) (501.74) (759.49) (927.57) (1,070.67) (1,050.53) (965.71) (979.76)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p<0.01,∗∗p<0.05,∗p<0.1
Yit is the outcome variable of interest for household i in year t, d05 is a dummy that equals 1 for the year 2005,
and dT is a dummy that equals 1 when household i belongs to SNB1 and equals zero when a household belongs
to the corresponding control group SNB0. dR and dK are dummy variables for Rangpur and Kurigram
districts. X02 is a vector of controls in 2002.
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